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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

GILBERT LOPEZ,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

Case No. 980085-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from a jury conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995).
This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal which was poured over from the Utah
Supreme Court (R. 217), under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Has defendant failed to overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel
rendered constitutionally adequate assistance or to show to a demonstrable reality
that trial counsel's representation undermines confidence in the guilty verdict?
This claim presents a question of law reviewed on the trial record because
defendant raises it for the first time on direct appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing.
State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const Amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
. . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (199^ (R. 1).
A three dayjury trial was held 14-16 October 1998 (R. 133-134, 137-138).
Following the presentation of all the evidence, and prior to jury deliberations, trial
counsel moved to dismiss the case on grounds that the eyewitness identification testimony
of the three victims was so inconsistent as to render evidence of defendant's guilt
insufficient (R. 246: 186) (copies of the pertinent transcript pages are contained in
addendum F).1 The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that any
inconsistencies in the identification evidence went to the credibility of the witnesses and
that the State had presented sufficient evidence to send the case to the jury (id). The jury

*Only the first page of the various volumes of transcript is numbered in the record
on appeal and subsequent pages retain their original numbering. Therefore, transcript
pages will be cited in this brief as "(R. [record number]: [internal page number])."
2
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thereafter convicted defendant as charged (R. 139; R. 231: 14-15).
The trial court imposed the statutory prison term of five years-to-life, which
sentence was to be served consecutively to any other sentence defendant was then serving
(R. 191). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 192).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Rick Bergsma had just purchased three cases of beer and was walking home with
his wife and brother-in-law when defendant and a cohort pointed a gun at him and also
pressed a gun to his wife's back, demanding the beer or they would shoot.
Aggravated Robbery
At approximately 12:45 p.m., on 21 July 1996, Rick and Brandi Bergsma and
Donny Drake were walking west on 2700 South near 700 East, in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Rick had just purchased approximately $56 dollars worth of Budweiser beer at the CircleK convenience store located at the intersection (R. 230: 97, 99-100; R. 246: 123).2
Suddenly, Donny noticed a suspicious car following them and instructed Rick and Brandi
to cut through the golf course that runs along the south side of 2700 South exclaiming,
"We're about to get robbed or something" (R. 230: 103, 208-209, 224). The suspicious
car parked at the Texaco gas station, located across the street and kitty-comer from the
Circle-K, with its headlights trained on the Bergsmas and Donny (R. 230: 155, 210, 225;

2

While the victims had just purchased beer, they had not been drinking (R. 230: 98,
222; R. 246: 49).
3
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I

R. 246: 15). Two men got out of the car and headed toward the victims (id). As the two
men ran toward them, Rick, Brandi and Donny started into the golf course (R. 230: 104,
156). Donny "knew" instantly what would follow: "I have seen it happen before. They
were creeping slow when I noticed they were looking at us" (R. 230: 208).
The robbers caught up with the Bergsmas and Donny and the first robber,
identified at trial as defendant, pointed his gun at Donny and then at Rick, stating "Yo,
Homes, drop your beer or I'll kill you" (R. 230: 104, 146, 210). Seeing the gun, Rick put
the beer down and stepped back one-half step (R. 230: 106). Defendant came within
three to four feet of the victims, until "he was right in front of [Rick]" (R. 230: 106, 211;
R. 246: 22). He then stuffed his gun down his pants and picked up the beer before
running back to his car (R. 230: 108, 157). The second robber, who was holding a gun to
Brandi's back, said, "Now, run, bitch," before joining defendant (R. 230: 109; R. 51).
While Rick and Brandi ran into the golf course, Donny "snuck (sic) around a bush and got
the license plate and make of the car" (R. 230: 214). After the car drove off, the victims
called police from the Texaco station (R. 230: 108; R. 246: 78).
Eyewitness Descriptions of Robbers
While the robbery occurred at night, all three victims agreed that the area was
sufficiently well-light for them to see the robbers and they provided descriptions of the
robbers to police five to ten minutes after the robbery (R. 230: 109, 153-155, 187, 226227; R. 246: 10-13, 110). Officer Michael Johnson, of the Salt Lake City Police
4
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Department, investigated the robbery and agreed that when the Texaco is open, as it was
at the time of the robbery, lighting conditions at the intersection are "very good" (R. 246:
80; R. 230: 101). The victims talked with investigating police for 15-20 minutes at the
Texaco station immediately following the robbery, spending approximately two minutes
filling out written witness report forms (R. 230: 129,213) (copies of the all three witness
report forms are contained in addendum A).
Rick Bergsma. Shaken and scared, Rick was nonetheless able to describe the first
robber (defendant) that held a gun to him as a "Spick" or Hispanic, approximately 22
years old, 5'5" tall and 165 pounds (R. 230: 111-112, 145-146, 164-165) (Exh. # 33), add.
A. Rick estimated that the robbery lasted 30 seconds and that he looked at the gun for 510 seconds and at defendant for 10-15 seconds (R. 230: 145). He particularly focused on
defendant's face, whom he described as having short straight brown hair, and no facial
hair (Exh. # 33), add. A. However, he also described defendant's clothing as a light shirt
and dark pants (R. 230: 106-07, 184). Rick described the second robber as a male
Hispanic, having a shaved head and a similar short and stocky build, approximately 5'6"
tall and 160-170 pounds (R. 230: 108) (Exh. # 33), add. A.
Brandi Bergsma. Although she was similarly "scared out of her wits," Brandi,
who is half Hispanic (R. 230: 196), also described the robbers as Hispanic and noted that
the first robber (defendant), the robber that held a gun to her husband, was "short," or
approximately 5f 1" to 5'5" tall, 145 pounds, with short black hair, no facial hair, and was
5
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wearing a white shirt and blue or dark colored pants (R. 246: 26,43,46) (Exh. #31), add.
A. Brandi described the second robber, or the robber that held a gun to her back as
having short fuzzy hair, "almost a buzz" (R. 246: 29).
Donny Drake. Finally, Donny also described the robbers as Hispanic or Mexican
(Exh. # 32), add. A. He described defendant as wearing dark shorts, a white t-shirt, and
as having short hair (R. 230: 211-212). Donny also similarly described the second robber
as approximately 18 years old, 57" tall, 150 pounds, and "kind of bald" (R. 230: 214215). Donny did not mention whether he observed facial hair on either robber (Exh. #
32), add. A.
Eyewitness Descriptions of Robbers'Monte Carlo
The victims also described the robbers' car: A brown or dark colored Cadillac or
Monte Carlo (R. 230: 112-113,208, 214-215; R. 246: 14) (Exh. ## 7-9). Rick thought
that the car had a light colored top (R. 230: 155, 182), and could not tell how many
people were in the car (R. 230: 183). Donny thought he saw four individuals, including
the two robbers, inside the car (R. 230: 208). Brandi thought she saw a female in the car
(R. 246: 25).
Robbers'Monte Carlo Located One Half Block from the Robbery
Approximately one half hour after the robbery, Officer Johnson headed back to the
police department traveling north on 700 East (R. 246: 81,124). At approximately 2400
South 700 East, the officer saw a Monte Carlo traveling south on 700 East which fit the
6
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victims' descriptions of the robbers' car down to the license plate {id.)? The Monte Carlo
pulled into a four-plex located at 2536 South 700 East, approximately one half block from
the crime scene (R. 246: 81, 99).4
Showup Identification of Defendant and Alleged Cohort
Officer Johnson approached to talk to a man exiting the Monte Carlo and
simultaneously noticed that afightwas breaking out in one of the apartments (R. 246: 8283, 116). Officer Johnson quickly made his way to the apartment as four men, including
defendant, ran down the stairs (R. 246: 83). He drew his weapon and ordered them to
stop, but one of the four men fled on foot (id). The three men were detained and
handcuffed (R. 246: 83-84). In addition to these individuals, the officer found two
females and another male inside the apartment (R. 246: 98). Officer Johnson observed
that three of the detained men matched the victims' descriptions of the robbers (R. 246:
85). The officer therefore had the victims brought to the apartment for a showup which
included these three men as well as the man who exited the Monte Carlo (R. 246: 86,
125).
Because lighting conditions were otherwise poor, Officer Johnson had several

3

Donny had reported that the robbers' license plate number was OL6 JLZ (id.).
The Monte Carlo Officer Johnson saw bore the plate number 016 JLZ (R. 246: 82).
4

The Monte Carlo was registered to Linda Trujillo, but her husband Steve drove
the car (R. 230: 202-203). Defendant and Steve Trujillo were friends at the time of the
robbery (R. 230: 204).
7
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officers train theirflashlightson the detained group, as well as patrol car headlights and
spotlights (R. 246: 87). When Officer Johnson approached the patrol vehicle in which the
victims had arrived, all three started talking at once and identified defendant and an
individual named Gary Gomez as the robbers (R. 246: 89; see R. 230: 131-134, 137-138;
218-220; R. 246: 32-37, 53). Rick and Donny both noticed that while defendant had
worn a white or light colored t-shirt at the time of the robbery, he had a black t-shirt on

,

over a white t-shirt at the time of the showup (R. 230: 134,219) (Exh. ##10-11) (copies
of the exhibits are contained in addendum B). All three witnesses also identified the
Monte Carlo at the four-plex as the robber's car (R. 230: 133, 22C-221; R. 246: 55) (Exh.
##7-9).
According to Officer Johnson, while the victims identified defendant as one of the
robbers, it was not until trial that they identified defendant as the robber that held a gun to
Rick and Donny (R. 246: 100-101). The victims also initially identified Gomez as the

<

robber which held the gun to Brandi's back {id.). Officer Johnson observed that
defendant and Gomez were both short and stocky, and were approximately 5?5" tall, and
<

150-160 pounds (R. 246: 90).5
5

At trial, Rick testified that defendant and Gomez were handcuffed when he
identified them at the showup (R. 246: 125-126). Donny did not mention whether any of
the suspects were handcuffed (R. 230: 218-220), and Brandi could not recall how many of
the suspects were handcuffed (R. 246: 52). Pictures of the suspects at the four-plex show
that Gomez at least, and possibly defendant, were handcuffed (R. 246: 102) (Exh. ## 24,
26) (copies of the exhibits are contained in addendum D). Officer Johnson thought it was
possible that the pictures of the suspects at the four-plex were taken after the showup

(

{
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Defendant Admits Being at the Scene of the Robbery
Both defendant and Gomez denied knowledge of the robbery and no weapons were
found on them (R. 246: 117-119). Defendant admitted, however, that he had been at the
Circle-K convenience store that evening, but claimed that he had only purchased beer (R.
246: 136-137). Police searched the apartment and found three cases of Budweiser beer
and saw beer cans spread throughout the apartment, but they found no beer receipts inside
the apartment or inside the robbers' Monte Carlo (R. 246: 94, 99).
Victims Identify Defendant and Alleged Cohort in Photo Spread
Officer Cheever of the Salt Lake City Police Department spoke with the victims
after the robbery to clarify their identifications of the robbers (R. 246: 139-141). He
showed all three victims separately and individually, a photo spread which included
pictures of defendant and Gomez and five other individuals with similar characteristics
(R. 246: 142) (Exh. ## 12-13, 15-20) (copies of the photos included in the photo spread
are contained in addendum E).6 Officer Cheever instructed the victims not to feel like
they had to identify any of the suspects, that the suspects in the aggravated robbery may
or may not be included in the photo spread, and that the suspects may not look exactly the
same as they did when the robbery occurred because they may have made changes to

identification and not before (R. 246: 125).
6

Detective Cheevers folded back booking information appearing on the photos,
prior to showing them to the witnesses (R. 246: 143).
9
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their physical appearance (R. 246: 143). All three witnesses immediately picked out
photos of defendant and Gomez and identified them as the robbers (R. 246: 144-146)
(Exh. ## 12-13), add. E. At this time, all three witnesses similarly agreed that defendant
was the robber that held a gun to Brandi's back, while Gomez was the robber that held a
gun on Donny and Rick (R. 246: 146-147).
Defendant Leaves Drinking Party to Get More Beer
Crystal Guiterrez is defendant's cousin and attended the drinking party held at the
four-plex on the night of the robbery7 (R. 246: 63-66). According to Crystal, defendant
and his friend Steve Trujillo w^re a. so at the party and talked about getting some more
beer (R. 246: 71). Defendant and Trujillo then left the party with two girls and returned
with beer (R. 246: 72). Crystal was unsure whether defendant was at the party between
12:30 p.m. and 1:00 a.m. (R. 246: 74). She was also unsure how many cases of beer
defendant brought with him when he returned to the party (R. 246: 75).
Defense witness Justin Ketterer is another cousin of defendant's that also attended
the drinking party the night of the robbery (R. 246: 164-165). Justin claimed that he
arrived with his brother, defendant and two girls at approximately 10:30 p.m. (R. 246:
165). He acknowledged that defendant left the party for approximately one half hour
with two girls and two guys (R. 246: 166, 173). However, Justin claimed that defendant

7

Crystal testified as a hostile witness for the prosecution (R. 246: 65).
10
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returned to the party at approximately 11:45 p.m. without the two girls (R. 246: 167).
According to Justin, afightbroke out around 12:45 p.m. and that is when he and his
brother left (R. 246: 168). Justin saw approximately 3-4 cases of beer before leaving the
party (R. 246: 169-170). On cross-examination, Justin admitted that he did not have any
special reason to remember the times of defendant's coming and going from the party (R.
246: 175). He also did not know what defendant did while he was absent from the party
(R. 246: 178).
Defendant's Alleged Cohort Establishes an Alibi
Crystal also testified that while Gomez attended the party, he did not bring any
beer with him (R. 246: 71). Charges against Gomez were ultimately dismissed because
he was able to substantiate his alibi at the time of the robbery through four different
witnesses (R. 246: 161).
Victims Identify Defendant as One of the Robbers
At trial, all three victims identified defendant as the robber that held a gun on
Donny and Rick (R. 230: 104-107, 134, 145-146, 191-192, 211, 240-241; R. 246: 22, 26).
Rick initially believed that defendant held the gun in his right hand, but at trial he
testified defendant held the gun in his left hand (R. 230: 178). Brandi also thought that
defendant held the gun in his right hand, but was unsure when she testified at trial (R.
246: 48). Donny consistently reported that defendant held the gun in his left hand (R.
230: 211, 241). Defendant is left-handed (R. 247: 16).
11
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Additionally, Rick and Brandi initially reported that defendant had no facial hair
(Exh. #31, 33), add. A. At trial, however, Rick acknowledged that in looking at pictures
of defendant taken at the time of his arrest, defendant's light facial hair was visible to him
in the courtroom from a distance of five feet (R. 230: 167-168), and Brandi remembered
for the first time that defendant had facial hair on his chin at the time of the robbery (R.
246: 29, 59). See also (Exh. ## 10-12) (pictures of defendant taken the night of his arrest)
(copies are contained in addendum B). Donny did not mention whether he observed
facial hair on either of the robbers (Exh. # 32), add. A.
Despite these minor discrepancies, all three victims were ultimately certain that
defendant was one of the robbers and that he had a gun (R. 230: 194, 241; R. 246: 41).
i

They also agreed that defendant's appearance had changed since the robbery: He
appeared to weigh less and to have longer hair (R. 230: 107, 192, 212; R. 246: 59).
Officer Johnson similarly noted the change in defendant's appearance between the time of

\

the aggravated robbery and the time of trial (R. 246: 93).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
i

Defendant fails to show that trial counsel's decision against attempting to suppress
pre-trial the three eyewitness identifications was other than a consciously chosen,
<

reasonable tactic, given the limited chance of success and the overall strength of the
evidence. Moreover, the tactic permitted defendant to challenge the strong, consistent
identification of the State's strongest witness, whose identification could not be
12
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(

suppressed under State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), by preserving for
impeachment the State's weaker witnesses. Given the strength of the witnesses
identifications, however, coupled with additional compelling evidence linking defendant
to the aggravated robbery, a pre-trial motion to suppress, even if granted with respect to
the weaker of the witnesses, would not have resulted in a more favorable trial outcome.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT FAILS TO OVERCOME THE STRONG
PRESUMPTION THAT TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED
CONSTITUTIONALLY ADEQUATE ASSISTANCE OR TO SHOW
TO A DEMONSTRABLE REALITY THAT TRIAL COUNSEL'S
PERFORMANCE UNDERMINES CONFIDENCE IN THE JURY'S
GUILTY VERDICT
Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective in not moving pre-trial to
suppress the eyewitness identifications under State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991).
However, defendant fails to show that a pre-trial motion to suppress the identifications
would likely have resulted in a more favorable trial outcome, given the motion's limited
chance of success and the overall strength of the trial evidence.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show
that trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and that there exists a
reasonable probability that absent the deficient conduct, he would have obtained a more
favorable outcome at trial. State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996) (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)); State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174

13
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(Utah App. 1992) (same). To demonstrate objectively deficient performance, defendant
must overcome a strong presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate assistance.
Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995); State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810 (Utah
App. 1994) (same). In addition, this Court will give trial counsel wide latitude in making
tactical decisions and will not question such decisions unless there is no reasonable basis
supporting them. Crosby, 927 P.2d at 644 (citing Taylor, 905 P.2d at 282); State v.
Callahan, 866 P.2d 590, 593 (Utah App. 1993) (same).
A.

Defendant Fails to Demonstrate the Likely Success of a Pre-trial
Motion to Suppress the Eyewitness Identifications and Therefore He
Fails to Demonstrate That Trial Counsel Performed Deficiently

Defendant asserts that in light of Ramirez, the eyewitness identifications in this
case were fatally flawed and that reasonable trial counsel, therefore, would have moved to
suppress them pre-trial. Aplt. Br. at 13-14. However, in evaluating the evidence under
the Ramirez factors and comparing it with the facts of Ramirez defendant has variously
omitted facts describing conditions and circumstances of observation superior to those in
Ramirez, gratuitously presumed the witnesses' compromised mental states throughout the
aggravated robbery, and overstated the suggestiveness of the showup in comparison with
that in Ramirez. In fact, the three eyewitness identifications in this case, are superior to
the sole eyewitness identification in Ramirez. Therefore, a pre-trial motion to suppress
would likely have failed and trial counsel reasonably elected not to exert time on a futile
motion. State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37,44 (Utah 1996).
14
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1.

The Eyewitness Identification in Ramirez was Based on Limited Capacity
and Opportunity to Observe, Made in Worse Conditions, Inconsistent
Over Time, and Uncorroborated by Any Other Witness

In Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court extended its recognition that eyewitness
testimony is both potent yet fallible, see State v. Long, 111 P.2d 483,488-91 (Utah 1986),
thereby requiring the trial court, in cases where eyewitness identification was central to
the case, to undertake "an in-depth appraisal of the identification's reliability/1
preliminary to admitting such testimony under article I, section 7 of the Utah
Constitution. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 780. Noting that M[t]he ultimate question to be
determined is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was
reliable," the supreme court listed the following pertinent factors by which reliability
must be determined:
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2)
the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the
witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and
mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was made
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and
the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it
correctly. This last area includes such factors as whether the event was an
ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it was observed
and whether the race of the actor was the same as the observer's.
Id. at 781 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493).8
8

In Ramirez, two armed, masked men robbed a Pizza Hut. Id. at 776. Shortly
before 1:00 a.m. Kathy Davis, the manager of the Pizza Hut, was preparing to leave the
restaurant with her husband, John Davis, and her brother, Gerald Wilson. Id. Upon
leaving, they were accosted by a man (the "pipe man") wearing a scarf across his face
15
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Applying the above-referenced factors to the eyewitness identification in Ramirez,
the supreme court found that, although an "extremely close case," the trial court had
properly denied the defendant's pre-trial motion to suppress. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 78284.9

who demanded the day's receipts. Id. A scuffle followed and the pipe man hit Wilson
with the pipe and told a previously undetected robber (the "gunman") to kill Wilson if he
moved again. Id. The gunman, Ramirez, also wore a scarf covering most of his face, and
was crouched near the corner of the building, holding a gun. Id. When the Davises
returned with the bank bag, the robbers fled. Id.
Ramirez was stopped a short time after the robbery and a few blocks from the
Pizza Hut, when he was found to match the description of one of the robbery suspects.
Id. at 776-777. Police brought the Davises and Wilson to the scene of Pamirez's
detention, apparently informing them that "the officers had found someone who matched
the description of one of the robbers." Id. at 777. When the witnesses arrived at the
showup, Ramirez, a dark-complexioned Apache Indian, was handcuffed to a chain link
fence. Id. He was the only suspect, and the spotlights and headlights of patrol cars were
turned on him. Id. The witnesses viewed him from a patrol car. Id. Only Wilson was
able to identify Ramirez as the gunman; the other two witnesses were unable to identify
him as one of the robbers. Id.

(

<

9

Regarding the first factor, the witness's opportunity to view the actor during the
event, the supreme court noted Wilson varied in his statements about how long he viewed
the gunman, from a "a few seconds" or "a second," to "a minute" or longer. Ramirez, 817
P.2d at 782. The evidence indicated that the gunman was crouched by the end of the
building, that Wilson viewed him from between ten to thirty feet, that at one point his
view was obstructed, that the lighting was variously described from good to poor and the
gunman was in a shadowy area, and that Wilson could only determine that the gunman's
eyes were small. Id. at 782-83.
As to the second factor, the witness's attention to the actor, Wilson was fully
aware that a robbery was taking place and claimed to have focused on the gunman to the
exclusion of the pipe man, even though he was still threatened by the pipe man when he
saw the gunman and gave a much more detailed description of the pipe man than of the
gunman at the time of the robbery. Id. at 783.
Regarding the third factor, the witness's capacity to observe the actor during the
event, the supreme court found that it was reasonable to assume that Wilson experienced
16
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i

2.

The Three Eyewitness Identifications in This Case Were All Superior to
the Sole Identification of the Eyewitness in Ramirez

Contrary to defendant's claims, see Aplt. Br. at 13-14, the three eyewitness
identifications in this case are superior to the sole identification in Ramirez, and would

"a heightened degree of stress," since, in struggling with his assailant, the witness was hit
once in the stomach with the pipe and almost hit a second time. Wilson described his
eyesight as good with his glasses, and f,[a]side from the late hour and the injury from the
pipe blow," there was no record evidence of any other physical impairments. Id.
The fourth reliability factor concerns whether the identification was spontaneous
and remained consistent or whether it was the product of suggestion. Id. In Ramirez, the
supreme court found that thirty minutes to an hour between the robbery and the
identification as no indication that Wilson's mental capacity affected his identification.
Id. at 783. Although he was aware that one of the other witnesses had not identified
Ramirez, he was not otherwise exposed to other identifications or opinions, and neither of
the other two witnesses identified Ramirez as the gunman. Id. However, the witness's
physical descriptions of the gunman were "confused." Id. Wilson gave a very detailed
description of the pipe man, but merely described the gunman as "a male Mexican, five
feet nine inches to six feet tall, wearing a blue sweater and Levi's, with a white scarf
around the lower part of his face." Id. John Davis, on the other hand, described Ramirez
as five foot six inches tall and wearing a red and white cap. Id. at 784. Although
Ramirez had readily visible tatoos on his arms, Wilson did not mention them at the time
of the robbery or at the preliminary hearing, stating for the first time at trial that he had
seen them on the gunman. Id. At the time of arrest, Ramirez was wearing Levi's and a
blue sweatshirt with paint spattered on the front, but which may have been worn inside
out and a brown baseball cap. Id. At the suppression hearing, Wilson positively stated
that the gunman wore no hat, although at trial he was not sure. Id.
Most "troublesome" for the supreme court was the "blatant suggestiveness"of the
showup, which, involved the lone suspect, handcuffed to a fence, the target of headlights,
surrounded by police who had indicated to witnesses that they had located someone who
fit one of the robber's description. Id. The suggestiveness of the showup was
compounded because none of the witnesses ever saw the gunman without the mask, and
the sole identifying witness made his identification based only on the gunman's eyes, a
view of which this Court assumed must have been compromised by the gunman's
wearing a hat. Id. The supreme court somewhat discounted the racial distinction because
the identification was based only on the gunman's eyes, physical size and clothing. Id.
17
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have been admissible in spite of the fact that the trial court did not have an opportunity to
review the evidence pursuant to a pre-trial Ramirez motion.
a.

Witness's Opportunity to View Defendant. The first Ramirez factor takes

into account an eyewitness's opportunity to view the suspects. Id. at 782. The Ramirez
robber was masked, crouched down, and viewed from ten to thirty feet away. Id. As set
out in detail in the Statement of the Facts, supra, all three witness's opportunity to
observe defendant exceeded that of the lone eyewitness in Ramirez, who saw only a
portion of Ramirez's masked face. Id. at 784.
The instant robor j lastea 30 seconds and occurred after dark; however, the
intersection was sufficiently lit from street and business lights for the witnesses to see
defendant's unmasked face (R. 230: 153-155, 226-227; R. 246: 10-13, 80). Indeed,
nothing in the record indicates the witnesses were unable to see defendant's face during
the robbery: He came within three to four feet of the victims until he was right in front of
Rick (R. 230: 106, 211; R. 246: 22). Rick estimated that he looked at defendant's gun for
five to ten seconds, and that he looked at defendant for 10-15 seconds (R. 230: 145). See
State v. Willetu 909 P.2d 218, 220, 224 (Utah 1995) (finding eyewitness's Mfew seconds"
observation of defendant "sufficiently reliable" to be admitted). Moreover, unlike the
eyewitness in Ramirez who identified Ramirez by his eyes, the three eyewitnesses in this
case provided information regarding defendant's clothing, race, hair color and style, and
they were also able to get some idea of his age, height, and weight (R. 246: 110). Their
18
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descriptions were close to the official description made when defendant was booked later
that night (Exh. # 12), add. A.10
Defendant places emphasis on the fact that the witnesses described the robber as
wearing a light shirt and dark pants, yet he was apprehended wearing a dark shirt over a
light shirt, a religious pendant around his neck, and khaki colored pants. Aplt. Br. at 19. ,
Because nearly one half hour away passed from the time of the robbery until defendant
was apprehended, it is possible that he changed his clothing in that time (R. 246: 124). In
any event, any discrepancies between the witnesses individual descriptions of defendant's
appearance and/or between defendant's appearance at the time of his arrest, do not render
the identifications inadmissible, but do bear on the individual eyewitness's credibility and
weight the jurors may give the identification testimony. State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648,
658 (Utah App. 1992), cert denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992); State v. Perry, 899 P.2d
1232, 1234-35 (Utah App. 1995) (upholding eyewitness identification describing Perry as
clean shaven, 5f6M to 57" tall and weighing approximately 150 pounds, when at the time
of his arrest a short while later, Perry was 5f9" tall, 170 pounds and had a slight
10

Defendant's booking photo indicates that he is a male Hispanic, born 16 March
1972, 5*4" tall, 180 pounds, with short straight dark hair, and thin or light facial hair (Exh.
#12), add. A. As for the any slight discrepancies between the eyewitnesses descriptions
and information listed on defendant's booking photo, Detective Cheever cautioned that
the "jailers" do not weigh the individual being booked, but rather ask the arrested person
what they weigh (R. 246: 148-149). He also pointed out that if a suspect has been
previously booked into jail at a certain weight and then loses weight and is booked into
jail on a later occasion, the jailers typically go by the suspect's criminal history and do
not update the information (id.).
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mustache).
b.

Witness's Degree of Attention and Capacity to Observe Defendant. The

witnesses' degree of attention to, and capacity to observe defendant were also superior to
that of the one eyewitness in Ramirez for purposes of the second and third Ramirez
factors. Donny's attention was drawn to the occupants of the Monte Carlo even before
the robbery, when he first noticed their suspicious behavior (R. 230: 208-209, 224). All
three witness's attention was drawn to the robbers by at least the time the robbers
instructed Rick to hand over the beer or be shot (R. 230: 104, 145-146, 180). Rick, in
particular, concentrated on remembering defendant's face as defendant held a gun on him
(R. 230: 184). Although the witnesses were frightened and agitated, nothing in the record
suggests their natural anxiety at being robbed hindered their ability to see defendant
clearly. Nor were there other distracting noises or activity in the intersection at the time
of the robbery. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782. Identification of the Ramirez robber, on the
other hand, was hindered by the fact that his accomplice was physically assaulting the
eyewitness in that case with a pipe. 817 P.2d 783. Finally, the record is also devoid of
indication that the witnesses acted under any personal motivation, bias, or prejudice, or
that their vision was poor, or that they were impaired by fatigue, injury, drugs or alcohol.
Ramirez, 817 P.2dat 783.
Defendant points to Rick's use of the ethnic slur MSpick"on his witness report form
(Exh. # 33), add. A, and claims that it indicates' Rick's bias. Aplt. Br. at 16. Rick
20
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

explained his use of the slur was based on his anger at being robbed, and cramped space
on the form (R. 230: 164-65). The prosecutor brought out that Rick's wife, Brandi, is half
Hispanic and that Rick's business partner is Hispanic (R. 230: 196-197). Additionally, all
of the suspects at the showup were Hispanic (R. 246: 84-85). Under these circumstances,
Rick's use of the ethnic slur is of "relatively little importance.M Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784.
c.

Witness's Spontaneity and Consistency in Identifying Defendant. The

fourth Ramirez factor takes into account the spontaneity and consistency of eyewitness
identifications. 817 P.2d at 783. The three eyewitnesses individually described
defendant immediately following the robbery at the Texaco station (R. 246: 110). They
also unhesitatingly identified defendant in a showup a little over one-half hour after the
robbery and their identification of him as one of the robbers remained consistent at a later
photo spread, and ultimately, at trial (R. 246: 89-90, 100, 144-146). See Ramirez, 817
P.2d at 783 (noting that elapsed time of 30 minutes to an hour between crime and witness
identification was minimal). Their initial descriptions of the robbers and their subsequent
identifications of defendant in the photo spread were independently obtained (see, e.g., R.
230: 227; R. 246: 44, 141). The only time the witnesses as a group identified defendant
was on their initial arrival at the showup, when they excitedly blurted out that they
recognized two of the suspects detained at the four-plex, even before the patrol car came
to a halt, and before police could point out who the actual suspects were (see, e.g., R. 230:
132-133,238; R. 246: 89-90). Under these facts, this spontaneous outburst supports,
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rather than undermines, the reliability of the identifications.
With regard to the consistency of the identifications, Rick, Brandi and Donny,
consistently identified defendant as one of the robbers, varying only as to his level of
participation in the aggravated robbery. They variously described defendant's
participation as that of an alleged third robber without a gun (R. 246: 101), the robber that
held a gun to Brandi (R. 246: 146-147), and the robber that a held a gun to Donny and
then to Rick (R. 230: 105-107, 211; R. 246: 22). However, because the victims did not
vary as to their identification of defendant as one of the robbers, and because the jury was
instructed as to defendant's lability as a party to the aggravated robbery, this variance is
relatively insignificant (see R. 156) (Jury Instruction #16) (a copy is contained in
addendum G).

"i

Additionally, for the first time at trial, Brandi recalled that defendant had facial
hair at the time of the robbery (R. 246: 29, 59). Rick also acknowledged that while he
had not noticed defendant's slight facial hair during the robbery, defendant's facial hair
was visible to him from a distance of five feet in the courtroom (R. 230: 167-168).
Compare Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783 (upholding eyewitness identification even though
witness failed to mention until trial that he had seen readily visible tattoos on Ramirez's
arms), with Perry, 899 P.2d at 1234-35 (upholding eyewitness identification which misdescribed Perry as clean shaven when he in fact had a slight mustache). Trial counsel
also brought out that Rick and Brandi had initially thought the robber that held a gun on
22
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Rick was right-handed but that Rick had described the robber as left-handed at trial and
that Brandi was uncertain (R. 230: 178; R. 246: 48). As noted earlier, these and any other
minor inconsistencies do not render the victims' identification of defendant as one of the
robber's inherently inadmissible; rather, it goes to weight of their testimony. Mincy, 838
P.2d at 658. The jurors were instructed accordingly {see R. 145) (Jury Instruction # 6) (a
copy is contained in addendum G).
d.

Suggestibility of Showup Less Egregious Than Ramirez Showup. The final

and most critical Ramirez factor concerns the suggestibility of the showup itself. Like the
showup in Ramirez, both Ramirez, and the group detained at the four-plex were
illuminated by police flashlights and patrol car headlights and spotlights. Like Ramirez,
defendant was likely identified in handcuffs, at night, in close proximity to police
officers, and Brandi, at least, was told that police thought they had Mthe people" they were
looking for (R. 230: 131, 138, 187; R. 246: 32). Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. However,
unlike Ramirez, defendant had the benefit of being picked out from among several other
Hispanic suspects (R. 230: 131; R. 246: 85-86). Because the circumstances surrounding
the instant eyewitness identifications of defendant are less problematic than those in
Ramirez, the admission of the testimony was proper in spite of the fact that the trial court
was not given the opportunity to review the evidence. Accord Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784.
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3.

Any Motion to Suppress the Eyewitness Identifications Would Have Been
Futile

"'"The failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if
raised does not constitute ineffective assistance."'" Hovater, 914 P.2d at 44 (citations
omitted). Based on the above, the three eyewitness identifications in this case were all
more reliable than Wilson's unsuppressed identification in Ramirez. Indeed, the
witnesses' observations of defendant were made in intrinsically better lighting conditions,
and generally from within a few feet. While the witnesses were threatened at gunpoint,
and Brandi had a gun held to her back, none of them were physically assaulted and
injured as was the lone eyewitness in Ramirez. Moreover, the uniformity of the witnesses
descriptions of defendant's race, approximate height, weight, and hairstyle lends weight

{

to the accuracy of the their individual observations. Finally, while the showup in both
this case and in Ramirez were virtually identical, significantly, defendant was picked out
from among several other Hispanic suspects. Accordingly, the eyewitness identifications
in this case were superior to Wilson's unsuppressed identification in Ramirez. This Court
should not therefore second-guess trial counsel's decision not to have wasted valuable
preparation time in attempting to suppress identifications that would have been held
constitutionally admissible. Hovater, 914P.2dat44.
Defendant broadly maintains, without specifying which, that at least one of the
identifications was suppressible under Ramirez. Aplt. Br. at 23. Even assuming one of

24
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the identifications was suppressible under Ramirez, trial counsel acted reasonably in not
moving to suppress any of the identifications. A motion to suppress the identifications
would have risked succeeding only as to the weakest, leaving trial counsel with only the
strongest identifications at trial. If only the strongest identifications were admitted, trial
counsel would not have been able to substantially impeach the identifications in crossexamination and effectively argue against the identifications in closing. See
Commonwealth v. Conceicao, 446 N.E.2d 383, 389 (Mass. 1983) (no ineffective
assistance in declining to file motion to suppress, alleging suggestive photographic
identification with "minimal chance of success," or based on tactical choice to instead
cross-examine witnesses extensively and strenuously argue the weakness of the
identification testimony); Commonwealth v. Levia, 431 N.E.2d 928, 933 (Mass. 1982)
(tactical decision to forego attempted suppression of weaker of two identification
witnesses and seek "spillover" effect from impeachment on cross-examination, and
noting, in support of that strategy, that the defense counsel cross examined the weaker
witness extensively and argued the weaknesses of his identification testimony in closing).
In the circumstances of this case, it was therefore reasonable trial strategy to
forego suppression entirely, a tactic which the Utah Supreme Court and others have found
sufficient to rebut claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. VillarreaU 889
P.2d 419,427 (Utah 1995) (upholding court of appeals' conclusion that trial counsel's not
objecting to references to seemingly prejudicial evidence of defendant's probationary
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record, dismissed criminal charges or victim's testimony, was "deliberate strategy falling
will within the standard of reasonable professional performance"); State v. Bullock, 791
P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989) (reasonable strategy in foregoing attempt to exclude
conceivably inadmissible, videotaped child hearsay statements and focus instead on "less
sympathetic" adult psychologist who could be shown to have employed "techniques akin
to brainwashing"), cert denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990). Indeed, trial counsel extensively
cross-examined Rick and Brandi on any limitations of their observations, inconsistencies
in their identifications, the suggestiveness of the showup and any uncertainty in their incourt identifications (R. 230: 152-170, i 6-191, ,98-200; R. 246: 43-53), which he
developed to show asserted distinctions from defendant's actual appearance (R. 230: 166176; R. 246: 43, 47-48, 50; R. 247: 30), and highlighted in closing argument (R. 247: 285 l). n In particular, trial counsel emphasized that all three witnesses had identified
Gomez as defendant's alleged cohort, yet charges against Gomez were dismissed because

<

he had established an alibi (R. 247: 31,41, 46). He also emphasized jury instruction #18
regarding the potential pitfalls in eyewitness identifications (R. 247: 47).12 Although trial
counsel's strategy did not produce the desired result, "an unfavorable result is not

1

* Trial counsel was less successful in regards to Donny's testimony which was
relatively free from inconsistency (R. 230: 223-238, 241).
12

Jury instruction #18 (R. 158-162) (a copy is contained in addendum G),
constituted a combination of the parties requested instructions based on State v. Long, 721
P.2dat488-91 (see R. 231:5-6).

<
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sufficient for and does not give rise to a conclusion of ineffective assistance of counsel."
State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1258 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted).
B.

Defendant Fails to Show that He was Prejudiced as a
Result of Trial Counsel's Performance

In claiming that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's performance below,
defendant complains that this case "is in a different posture" than Ramirez was because it
lacks a trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law on admissibility of the
eyewitness identifications. Aplt. Br. at 23-24. He mistakenly and illogically argues that
it would be inappropriate for this Court to make its own findings and conclusions in the
absence of those of the trial court. Aplt. Br. at 24.
As set out above, this case is not nearly as "close" as Ramirez, since there is no
reasonable probability that the trial court would have suppressed the eyewitness
testimony.13 This case is also not like Ramirez, where the supreme court held that the trial
court had "abdicated its duty to rule and make findings "when the issue of suppression of
illegal search and seizure was] raised." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 787 (emphasis added).14 In
"See State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1987) (finding no abuse of
discretion in trial court's refusal to exclude equivocal eyewitness testimony of
identifications made in less than opportune circumstances under pre-Zcwg standard), cert,
denied, 485 U.S. 1036 (1988); Perry, 899 P.2d at 1238 (finding eyewitness identification
reliable even though victim, during a nighttime assault where threatened with a knife,
viewed her assailant by street lights and possibly the dome light of her car for about 20
seconds and later at a suggestive showup).
XA

See also State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 944 (Utah App. 1997) (conviction
vacated where, following motion to suppress and proffer of expert, trial court
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this case, the trial court was never asked to consider a pre-trial Ramirez motion.
However, at the conclusion of all the evidence, trial counsel did move to dismiss on
grounds that the eyewitness identifications were so inconsistent as to render evidence of
defendant's guilt insufficient to go to the jury (R. 246: 186), add. F. The trial court

\

disagreed, ruling that any inconsistencies in the identifications went to the witness's
credibility and that the State had presented sufficient evidence to send the case to the jury
(id). The trial court was thus granted an opportunity to rule on the quality of the witness
identifications and found nothing inherently unreliable therein (id.). The absence of
i

Ramirez findings and conclusions here therefore, does not present the same difficulty as
in Ramirez. In any event, defendant explicitly begs this Court to rule without findings
and conclusions, since he has argued that the record is adequate to review the

(

admissibility of the identifications, even though the claim of ineffective assistance was
not raised in the trial court. See Aplt. Br. at 1 (citing Hovater, 914 P.2d at 40).
Furthermore, in addition to the corroborative and consistent identifications of
defendant as one of the robbers, there was Donny's observation of the robbers' license
<

plate number (R. 230: 214-215; R. 246: 82). In fact, the robbers' Monte Carlo was
discovered about one half block from the crime scene (R. 246: 80-82, 99), and defendant
was discovered in attendance at the beer party being held at that same address (R. 246:

"sidestepped its gatekeeping responsibility by failing to determine the constitutional
admissibility of the eyewitness testimony").
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90). Defendant, moreover, left the party for approximately one half hour that evening for
the purpose of obtaining more beer (R. 246: 71). Defendant's cousin Crystal was not sure
whether defendant was present at the party between 12:30 p.m. and 1:00 a.m., the
approximate time of the robbery (R. 246: 74).15 When the police arrived approximately
one half hour after the robbery, only 7 or 8 people were present (R. 246: 98).
Additionally, the robbers' Monte Carlo was registered to the wife of a friend of
defendant's, Steve Trujillo, who resembles Gary Gomez, the robbery suspect identified
by the witnesses, but against whom charges were dismissed when he established an alibi
(R. 230: 202-204) (compare Exh. # 13 (Gomez' booking photo)), add. E, and (Exh. ## 14,
37) (copies of Trujillo's booking photos are contained in addendum C).
Finally, defendant admitted being present at the scene of the robbery, claiming he
had purchased the Budweiser beer he brought back to the party at the same Circle-K
where Rick Bergsma purchased the Budweiser beer that was stolen from him that night
(R. 246: 136-137). No beer receipts were recovered from inside the Monte Carlo, or the
apartment where the drinking party was held (R. 246: 99). In sum, even if one or two of
the eyewitness identifications had been suppressed, it would not have resulted in a more
favorable verdict, considering the additional compelling evidence.

15

Defendant's cousin Justin testified for the defense and claimed that defendant
returned to the party at approximately 11:45 p.m., but acknowledged on crossexamination that he had no special reason to accurately recall the time of defendant's
return (R. 246: 167, 175).
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CONCLUSION
This Court should reject as unsubstantiated, defendant's allegations of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, and affirm his conviction for aggravated robbery.
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IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH' '
* * * * *

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. 961901575

GILBERT LOPEZ,
Defendant.
* * * * *

BEFORE THE HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
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we'll have them order lunch when they come in at 10:30,
and have it delivered at 11:30 or whatever, so they can
start their deliberations on a good note, feeling that
the state's done one little thing for them, if nothing
else.

Anything else that we need to discuss?

Do you

want to make your motion now, Mr. Garcia, on the record?
MR. GARCIA:

For the record, Your Honor, at

the end of the state's case in chief I'd make a motion
to dismiss.

There is not sufficient evidence, given the

contradictory nature of all of this testimony, to send
the case to the jury.
THE COURT:
motion.

All right.

I understand the

The motion is denied, this is a jury issue.

Whether they find the witnesses credible, despite some
inconsistencies, if they find they exist, is up to the
jury.

It's certainly enough to go to their at this

juncture, in my opinion.
So we will take a break, give my court
reporter and counsel and the court at least fifteen
minutes.

So we'll come back at about quarter after and

see whether you've got a rebuttal witness you want to
call.
(Brief recess.)
THE COURT:

Are we putting on a rebuttal

witness?
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FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

AUG 2 0 1999
Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court
JAN

GRAHAM

ATTORNEY GENERAL
CAROL CLAWSON

REED RICHARDS

PALMER DEPAULIS

Solicitor General

Chief Deputy Attorney General

Chief of Staff

Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State Street
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
August 20, 1999
BRIEF
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lOCUMENT
U
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Re: State v. Zqpez, Case No. 981085-CA
Dear Ms. D'Alesandro:
In preparing for the oral argument in this matter, scheduled to be held on 27
August 1999, the State became aware of pertinent authority concerning the argument set
out in the brief at pp. 20-23. Accordingly, the State cites as supplemental authority, State
v. Rivera, 954 P.2d 225,227-229 (Utah App. 1998).
This supplemental authority is submitted pursuant to rule 24(h), Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
Sincerely,

RIAN DECKER
ssistant Attorney General
cc:

Robert K. Heineman
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